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Being a Pious French 
Muslim Woman
J E A N E T T E  S .  J O U I L I the staircase, outside the building. But 
to bother us, the secretaries walked 
their dogs there to dirty the place. My 
brother told me that they prayed in 
a room in the cave of his university. 
But when the janitors found out, they 
closed the room. The students decided 
to pray in the hall in front of everyone. 
Finally, the administrators preferred to 
reopen the room. There are a lot of sto-
ries like that.” 
Religious practices such as salat and 
hijab, which render oneself visible 
within public spheres, mark and claim 
ones presence—something which is one of the more general objec-
tives of contemporary Islamic movements.3 The search for recognition 
through visibility—a visibility which is also articulated in terms of “Is-
lamic self-confidence”—equally reflects the desire of Islamic revival 
movements to reject the inferior image of Muslims and to claim, with 
the same act, pride for a consciously appropriated identity. Therefore, 
from a “public deficit,” the Islamic identity becomes a “subcultural ad-
vantage.”4 This hints at a typical feature of the struggle for recognition 
by minority and stigmatized groups: visibility is considered a source 
of power whereas its opposite, invisibility, becomes a sign of oppres-
sion.5 
The struggle for recognition is however not always articulated 
through the principle of public visibility and can, at times, be articu-
lated in quite different terms, as for example by referring to da‘wa. 
While this term is also used by the women in its classical meaning, that 
is “calling” to the righteous path of Islam, here it denotes the strug-
gle of representing “Islam” positively to the non-Muslim other, thereby 
countering its negative image. Since this “representative” da‘wa is now 
perceived to be the precondition for the (social, political, and spiritual) 
well-being of the Muslim umma in the West it has thereby been el-
evated to the status of religious obligation. 
While this form of da‘wa can equally be practiced in different do-
mains of social interaction and everyday politics, pious Muslim women 
often feel that they have a particular role to play in counteracting the 
negative images of Islam, which prevail in French majority society. One 
of the most effective means to counter these images is, according to 
these women, to participate actively and successfully in society—es-
pecially by pursuing a professional career and thereby embodying the 
image of a “modern” Muslim woman.
However, the wearing of hijab as well as the punctual performance 
of the ritual prayer is difficult to accomplish in the workplace. Not 
only because, in the French understanding, the hijab constitutes an 
illegitimate intrusion of a private practice into the public sphere, but 
also because of the general public perception of these practices in 
France. In this perception, the headscarf, as the successive debates of 
the “headscarf affairs” have shown, is almost unanimously dismissed 
as a symbol of female oppression. Correspondingly, praying regularly 
(i.e. visibly) is considered either as a sign of lack of integration or of 
holding radical views.6
In this context, pious women face two seemingly irreconcilable 
Islamic duties: the honouring of (socially stigmatized) religious obli-
gations and the promotion of da‘wa in the sense of well represent-
ing Islam. And while both duties are inscribed into the overall goal 
of constructing a morally strong and flourishing community, they are 
grounded on completely different logics: Islamic dress and prayer are 
considered to be part of the Sharia, the clearly defined norms at the 
level of ‘ibadat and mu‘amalat that function as crucial self-practices 
for the constitution and consolidation of the pious subject one aspires 
There has been much recent discussion 
about the challenges that French laïcité 
poses to the integration of Islam. Ac-
cording to the notion of French laïcité, 
a particularly strict version of seculari-
ty, public spheres are defined in a more 
normative way than in other European 
societies; equally, the demand on the 
individual to conform to those norms is 
also much stronger. It requires, among 
other things, to respect the “obligation 
of restraint,” which means to refrain 
from displaying any signs of religious 
or other particularistic allegiance.1 
From this follows that the Islamic code of modesty that pious Muslim 
women adopt—most visibly embodied through the headscarf—implic-
itly denotes a questioning of the definition of the laïque public sphere 
and therefore significantly endangers their successful participation in 
these places. Another matter which, though less likely to attract pub-
lic attention, also involves a physical commitment to one’s faith is the 
performance of salat, the prayer ritual performed 
routinely by pious Muslims. 
In this context, upholding one’s religious 
practice cannot be taken for granted and pious 
women generally have to consider whether or 
not, and how, to introduce these practices. Practi-
cally, this means to reflect on the degree of vis-
ibility, which might be accompanied by either a 
claim for expressing one’s religiosity or by an ac-
commodative stance in regard to the demand for 
restraint in public.
While Islamic rituals and bodily (hence visible) 
practices are first and foremost ethical self-disci-
plines crucial for fashioning the pious self,2 in a 
secular context they are generally understood as 
“symbols,” by which these acts become “texts” to 
be deciphered by others. In a context of migra-
tion and minority, they are potentially deciphered 
with negative connotations. None epitomizes this 
better than the hijab. Pious women are highly 
aware that they have to engage with this nega-
tive reading by the majority society. This is where 
identity politics comes into play. 
Struggling for recognition
One of the central considerations for many 
pious Muslims in France is the question of gain-
ing recognition from the majority society both as 
pious and modern Muslim women. This struggle 
for recognition is regularly framed in terms of 
claiming rights, i.e. the right to live as a practicing 
Muslim in the French society. It is by referring to 
rights that many women frequently issue statements like the follow-
ing: “We have to demand our rights. We should go to work with our 
veils, if we are qualified. We have to show that we exist.”
Not only does the much-discussed question of the headscarf, but 
also the less-debated question of praying, gives rise to such demands. 
And as much as the hijab has done, salat has the potential to give rise 
to a struggle over the definition of secular space. The following ac-
count given by one woman about the situation at university clearly 
reflects the tensions which arise from these claims; tensions which can 
be played out in an almost theatrical fashion: “We used to pray under 
In secular France visible religious practice is 
socially discouraged within public spheres. 
For pious Muslims, in particular pious 
Muslim women, who actively participate 
in these spheres, piety cannot be lived out 
without encountering certain problems. 
The negotiations that these women engage 
in, favouring at times visibility, at times 
invisibility, not only allow the living of virtuous 
lives under often difficult circumstances, but 
more importantly are part of a process by which 
ethical Muslim selves are constituted in secular, 
non-Islamic contexts.
The search for 
recognition through 
visibility … reflects 
the desire … to 
reject the inferior 
image of Muslims 
and [claim] pride 
for a consciously 
appropriated 
identity.
to be.7 Da‘wa addressed at the non-Muslim majority society—through 
women’s successful social participation—has to take into account def-
initions of modernity, progressiveness, or female emancipation domi-
nant in the majority society. Therefore, both duties potentially require 
the performance of a different kind of public self. 
Evidently, these two types of “Islamic” duties built on different logics 
are difficult to combine and require a continual, self-reflexive nego-
tiation. When the importance of da‘wa is stressed, strategies, which 
render the accomplishment of these religious obligations less visible, 
become for some women a viable option. This becomes particularly 
clear in regard to the issue of veiling. Many pious Muslim women who 
do not veil, do so for especially this reason (while they uphold at the 
same time strict norms for their dress style: clothes covering arms and 
legs and hiding one’s forms); some will unveil only during work. Oth-
ers will wear a “discrete” headgear, a hat, or a “bandana” (a practice 
which has however become increasingly difficult in the aftermath of 
the 2004 law banning “conspicuous” religious symbols from public 
schools). When discussing these different choices inspired by the idea 
of da‘wa, the women always express an awareness that their choices 
have to be justified (and justifiable) towards God, considered to be the 
ultimate judge. Accordingly, those women frequently reflect, in a self-
critical fashion, on whether the idea of representing Islam bears with 
it the risk of a too easy legitimization of conforming oneself to social 
pressures from the secular society. 
Enduring rejection
The different choices regarding visibility reflect aspirations such as 
recognition, participation, and justice; aspirations which are usually 
considered to be constitutive of agency. However, these women also 
take into account other considerations that seem to be antithetical to 
the former. Apart from claiming rights and recognition, pious Muslim 
women also frequently appeal to God as the just and supreme agent in 
whom one should place all of ones trust. An outright “claim of rights” 
would in this sense even be counterproductive for the ultimate goal of 
leading a pious life. As a woman who teaches in an Islamic 
organization explained: “If I claim my rights but do not also 
ask for Allah’s help, my approach is wrong. If I put … my 
hope in human beings instead of in Allah, my approach is 
wrong. Of course, you have to claim your rights, although 
this is pretty hopeless these days, but I do not lose hope in 
Allah’s help in this situation.” 
Without actually doubting the usefulness of claiming 
rights, many women regularly insist on the importance of 
attributing the first “agency” to the divine rather than to the 
human. This idea needs to prevail in the believer’s conscience 
and should never be forgotten whenever claims, such as the 
right to wear the headscarf at work or the right for a prayer 
space, are articulated in opposition to the wishes of the ma-
jority society. By placing one’s “hopes in Allah” rather than “in 
men,” the idea of an autonomous subject, determining alone 
its acts, is clearly rejected. 
Closely linked to confidence in God is the duty of patience 
(sabr) in the face of hardship. When talking about the dif-
ficulties they faced in regard to the headscarf, either by not 
finding employment because of the veil or by being obliged 
not to veil (whether out of considerations of da‘wa or out of 
necessity), many pious women refer concretely to sabr. One 
woman, for example, who unveils for work and for whom 
this act is not unproblematic, addresses the idea of trust in 
God and sabr: “Insha’allah, times will change. I have confi-
dence in Allah and one day, we will be accepted with our 
headscarf. We have to be patient right now.” The statements 
of these pious women invoke somehow a divine interven-
tion at the same time as they insist on the necessity of re-
sisting and combating actively pressures and prejudices in 
regard to the headscarf. While the latter appears to be af-
firming agency, the former appears to abandon the concept 
altogether. To better apprehend the apparent contradiction, 
Asad’s reflections on the concept of agency are helpful. He 
shows that notions like suffering and endurance are not syn-
onymous with “passivity,” but that, in certain traditions, they 
may “create a space for moral action.”8 That is to say, they 
render certain modalities of engagement with the world 
possible and constitute a form of agency, albeit one that is different 
from the dominant secular, progressive understanding. 
Between visibility and invisibility: a pious 
negotiation
The choices pious women make in regard to their Islamic practice 
within French secular public spheres differ significantly (the concrete 
social consequences of their choices vary even more). These different 
choices are the result of the individual and subjective evaluations and 
interpretations of the different ethical requirements the women are 
faced with. Accordingly, da‘wa is understood as representing Islam or 
as the cultivation and practice of Islamic virtues, 
such as placing trust in God and endurance of 
hardships; requirements which have to be pur-
sued in regard to the overall goal of leading a 
God-pleasing life.
By analyzing how these particular pious nego-
tiations in the context of French secularity result 
in concrete choices of visibility and invisibility, it 
becomes evident how much the constitution of 
Muslim subjectivities depends on concrete social 
conditions (here strict secularity and minority 
condition) out of which new moral requirements 
ensue. The pious negotiation undertaken by 
pious Muslim women should be considered one 
of the contextual practices shaping ethical Mus-
lim selves in a secular, non-Islamic environment.
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